

SECRET

18 September 1963

REPORT OF CONTACT w/ []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOOSEXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007


MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

1. On 9 September 1963, it was agreed by telephone that the undersigned, [] (wife), would meet Subjects on 11 September 1963 at the New York Hilton Hotel sometime after the close of business, circa 1800 hours. When Subjects had not arrived at 2000 hours, a call was made to their office but no one answered. Subjects arrived at 2015 hours and the debriefing continued until 2345 hours. No plans were made for a future meeting and any written correspondence should be directed to their home address, since there is a new Ukrainian-American secretary now employed in their office.

PERSONAL SITUATION

2. Subjects both made a fine impression, and again it was noted that [] (wife) is the power and the authority in the marriage. Both were well dressed, but [] was quite glamorous in her chignon, mantilla and gold brocade cocktail dress with gold shoes. It is believed that both had attended the Air India reception before meeting the undersigned. They admitted they had had a few drinks and dinner. [] refused a cocktail but her husband had a drink, using the bathroom ice machine. They were interested in the hotel, one of New York's newest, and in its many electronic features. As the evening wore on, [] became somewhat bored and tired, yawned quite openly and later donned his "sunglasses" to save his eyes. However, [] was alert, cooperative and business-like until the very end. Both referred to their previous case officer, [] [] [], in a friendly and respectful manner, and it was apparent that excellent rapport had been established which is bound to assist the undersigned in his relationship. Subjects admit that they now can relax somewhat until next spring when the big travel push begins again. [] also combines an insurance business with his wife's travel office. They regret that their neighborhood on 10th Street has become run-down of late by the influx of thousands and thousands of Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Most of the old Slavonic types have departed for the suburbs, but Subjects are not ready to move yet.

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SECURITY

3. The meeting was held in as secure a fashion as possible, and no one saw Subjects together with the undersigned. The radio played during the discussions.

4. The security aspects of Subjects' trip to the USSR will be covered in their debriefing report, and it makes very interesting reading indeed since it is obvious that the group which Subjects took to the USSR this year was the object of harassment and surveillance of an extreme variety and, in spite of the undersigned's defensive briefing and the Subjects' warnings, several "incidents" did occur.

5. [] continues to take extensive notes during her travels to the USSR. This is her fourth or fifth trip in six years and her husband was with her until Kiev, at which time he departed for the United States. Although Subject [] takes only the most obvious of notes on sites seen, people met and accommodations utilized, she has had her fears in the past and has swallowed certain of them. Whether sensitive or not, the mere fact that [] is noted writing in her pad is bound to cause some consternation on the part of the Soviets.

OPERATIONAL DISCUSSION

6. [] was debriefed in some detail concerning her recent trip to the USSR, 27 July - 18 August, and the reports are being produced as attachments to this report. A certain amount of positive intelligence, CE information and some CA and OI was also acquired in sufficient amount to make the debriefing session of value.

7. [] has been offered an Inturist contract but still has not made up her mind as to whether or not she should accept it. In the past, CIA representatives have told her that she alone must decide this matter and that CIA cannot and will not influence her decision. [] is torn between two poles: she wishes to maintain her independence but, at the same time, desires to increase the size of her business. She fears that she may be exploited by the Communists, or at least given a bad name by them, if she accepts a franchise, and for the time being she will remain independent and work through other American Inturist offices.

8. [] made a preliminary report on her trip to the USSR while visiting the American Embassy in Moscow. She cannot recall the name of the Embassy official, a vice-consul, with whom she spoke but he was most interested in her remarks.

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9. [] was told that, in the future, she need only send the names, point of origin and United States addresses of those Soviet-Ukrainians whom she learns are arriving in the USSR, as well as the names and addresses of American travelers to the USSR whom she finds unusual from a CE or FI view.

10. Both Subjects agreed to help CIA in the future as their time and access allowed. [] was specially outspoken in this regard and apologized for not having had the time during recent months to write as many letters as she had in the past.

C/O COMMENTS

11. The operational portions of this report will be distributed to the appropriate DDP elements. It is also suggested that the FBI be advised of the detentions of certain members of the group and the arrest of at least one. Thought will be given to making contact with at least two individuals: Myron KURAPAS, of Chicago, and (Fnu) HASAJ, of Fleishmann, New York, who is the uncle of Mikola Ivanovich HASAJ.

12. It is believed that the results of this meeting and the defensive interest revealed warranted the case officer time involved.

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